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Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer 
 
Abstract 
 
   This document describes algorithms based on Elliptic Curve 
   Cryptography (ECC) for use within the Secure Shell (SSH) transport 
   protocol.  In particular, it specifies Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
   (ECDH) key agreement, Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key 
   agreement, and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for 
   use in the SSH Transport Layer protocol. 
 
Status of This Memo 
 
   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the 
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for 
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet 
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state 
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited. 
 
Copyright Notice 
 
   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors.  All rights reserved. 
 
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents 
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must 
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 
   described in the BSD License. 
 
   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF 
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November 
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this 
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow 
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. 
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling 
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified 
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   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may 
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format 
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other 
   than English. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
   This document adds the following elliptic curve cryptography 
   algorithms to the Secure Shell arsenal: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
   (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), as 
   well as utilizing the SHA2 family of secure hash algorithms. 
   Additionally, support is provided for Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu- 
   Vanstone (ECMQV). 
 
   Due to its small key sizes and its inclusion in the National Security 
   Agency's Suite B, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is becoming a 
   widely utilized and attractive public-key cryptosystem. 
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   Compared to cryptosystems such as RSA, the Digital Signature 
   Algorithm (DSA), and Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, ECC variations 
   on these schemes offer equivalent security with smaller key sizes. 
   This is illustrated in the following table, based on Section 5.6.1 of 
   NIST 800-57 [NIST-800-57], which gives approximate comparable key 
   sizes for symmetric- and asymmetric-key cryptosystems based on the 
   best known algorithms for attacking them.  L is the field size and N 
   is the sub-field size. 
 
      +-----------+------------------------------+-------+---------+ 
      | Symmetric | Discrete Log (e.g., DSA, DH) |  RSA  |   ECC   | 
      +-----------+------------------------------+-------+---------+ 
      |     80    |       L = 1024, N = 160      |  1024 | 160-223 | 
      |           |                              |       |         | 
      |    112    |       L = 2048, N = 256      |  2048 | 224-255 | 
      |           |                              |       |         | 
      |    128    |       L = 3072, N = 256      |  3072 | 256-383 | 
      |           |                              |       |         | 
      |    192    |       L = 7680, N = 384      |  7680 | 384-511 | 
      |           |                              |       |         | 
      |    256    |      L = 15360, N = 512      | 15360 |   512+  | 
      +-----------+------------------------------+-------+---------+ 
 
   Implementation of this specification requires familiarity with both 
   SSH [RFC4251] [RFC4253] [RFC4250] and ECC [SEC1] (additional 
   information on ECC available in [HMV04], [ANSI-X9.62], and 
   [ANSI-X9.63]). 
 
   This document is concerned with SSH implementation details; 
   specification of the underlying cryptographic algorithms is left to 
   other standards documents. 
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2.  Notation 
 
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 
 
   The data types boolean, byte, uint32, uint64, string, and mpint are 
   to be interpreted in this document as described in [RFC4251]. 
 
   The size of a set of elliptic curve domain parameters on a prime 
   curve is defined as the number of bits in the binary representation 
   of the field order, commonly denoted by p.  Size on a 
   characteristic-2 curve is defined as the number of bits in the binary 
   representation of the field, commonly denoted by m.  A set of 
   elliptic curve domain parameters defines a group of order n generated 
   by a base point P. 
 
3.  SSH ECC Public Key Algorithm 
 
   The SSH ECC public key algorithm is defined by its key format, 
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   corresponding signature algorithm ECDSA, signature encoding, and 
   algorithm identifiers. 
 
   This section defines the family of "ecdsa-sha2-*" public key formats 
   and corresponding signature formats.  Every compliant SSH ECC 
   implementation MUST implement this public key format. 
 
3.1.  Key Format 
 
   The "ecdsa-sha2-*" key formats all have the following encoding: 
 
      string   "ecdsa-sha2-[identifier]" 
      byte[n]  ecc_key_blob 
 
   The ecc_key_blob value has the following specific encoding: 
 
      string   [identifier] 
      string   Q 
 
   The string [identifier] is the identifier of the elliptic curve 
   domain parameters.  The format of this string is specified in 
   Section 6.1.  Information on the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED sets of 
   elliptic curve domain parameters for use with this algorithm can be 
   found in Section 10. 
 
   Q is the public key encoded from an elliptic curve point into an 
   octet string as defined in Section 2.3.3 of [SEC1]; point compression 
   MAY be used. 
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   The algorithm for ECC key generation can be found in Section 3.2 of 
   [SEC1].  Given some elliptic curve domain parameters, an ECC key pair 
   can be generated containing a private key (an integer d), and a 
   public key (an elliptic curve point Q). 
 
3.1.1.  Signature Algorithm 
 
   Signing and verifying is done using the Elliptic Curve Digital 
   Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).  ECDSA is specified in [SEC1].  The 
   message hashing algorithm MUST be from the SHA2 family of hash 
   functions [FIPS-180-3] and is chosen according to the curve size as 
   specified in Section 6.2.1. 
 
3.1.2.  Signature Encoding 
 
   Signatures are encoded as follows: 
 
      string   "ecdsa-sha2-[identifier]" 
      string   ecdsa_signature_blob 
 
   The string [identifier] is the identifier of the elliptic curve 
   domain parameters.  The format of this string is specified in 
   Section 6.1.  Information on the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED sets of 
   elliptic curve domain parameters for use with this algorithm can be 
   found in Section 10. 
 
   The ecdsa_signature_blob value has the following specific encoding: 
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      mpint    r 
      mpint    s 
 
   The integers r and s are the output of the ECDSA algorithm. 
 
   The width of the integer fields is determined by the curve being 
   used.  Note that the integers r and s are integers modulo the order 
   of the cryptographic subgroup, which may be larger than the size of 
   the finite field. 
 
4.  ECDH Key Exchange 
 
   The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange method 
   generates a shared secret from an ephemeral local elliptic curve 
   private key and ephemeral remote elliptic curve public key.  This key 
   exchange method provides explicit server authentication as defined in 
   [RFC4253] using a signature on the exchange hash.  Every compliant 
   SSH ECC implementation MUST implement ECDH key exchange. 
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   The primitive used for shared key generation is ECDH with cofactor 
   multiplication, the full specification of which can be found in 
   Section 3.3.2 of [SEC1].  The algorithm for key pair generation can 
   be found in Section 3.2.1 of [SEC1]. 
 
   The family of key exchange method names defined for use with this key 
   exchange can be found in Section 6.3.  Algorithm negotiation chooses 
   the public key algorithm to be used for signing and the method name 
   of the key exchange.  The method name of the key exchange chosen 
   determines the elliptic curve domain parameters and hash function to 
   be used in the remainder of this section. 
 
   Information on the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED elliptic curve domain 
   parameters for use with this method can be found in Section 10. 
 
   All elliptic curve public keys MUST be validated after they are 
   received.  An example of a validation algorithm can be found in 
   Section 3.2.2 of [SEC1].  If a key fails validation, the key exchange 
   MUST fail. 
 
   The elliptic curve public keys (points) that must be transmitted are 
   encoded into octet strings before they are transmitted.  The 
   transformation between elliptic curve points and octet strings is 
   specified in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 of [SEC1]; point compression 
   MAY be used.  The output of shared key generation is a field element 
   xp.  The SSH framework requires that the shared key be an integer. 
   The conversion between a field element and an integer is specified in 
   Section 2.3.9 of [SEC1]. 
 
   Specification of the message numbers SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT and 
   SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY is found in Section 7. 
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   The following is an overview of the key exchange process: 
 
      Client                                                Server 
      ------                                                ------ 
      Generate ephemeral key pair. 
      SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT  --------------> 
 
                                      Verify received key is valid. 
                                       Generate ephemeral key pair. 
                                             Compute shared secret. 
                                   Generate and sign exchange hash. 
                             <------------- SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 
 
      Verify received key is valid. 
      *Verify host key belongs to server. 
      Compute shared secret. 
      Generate exchange hash. 
      Verify server's signature. 
 
      *  It is RECOMMENDED that the client verify that the host key sent 
         is the server's host key (for example, using a local database). 
         The client MAY accept the host key without verification, but 
         doing so will render the protocol insecure against active 
         attacks; see the discussion in Section 4.1 of [RFC4251]. 
 
   This is implemented using the following messages. 
 
   The client sends: 
 
      byte     SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 
      string   Q_C, client's ephemeral public key octet string 
 
   The server responds with: 
 
      byte     SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 
      string   K_S, server's public host key 
      string   Q_S, server's ephemeral public key octet string 
      string   the signature on the exchange hash 
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   The exchange hash H is computed as the hash of the concatenation of 
   the following. 
 
      string   V_C, client's identification string (CR and LF excluded) 
      string   V_S, server's identification string (CR and LF excluded) 
      string   I_C, payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT 
      string   I_S, payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT 
      string   K_S, server's public host key 
      string   Q_C, client's ephemeral public key octet string 
      string   Q_S, server's ephemeral public key octet string 
      mpint    K,   shared secret 
 
5.  ECMQV Key Exchange 
 
   The Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key exchange algorithm 
   generates a shared secret from two local elliptic curve key pairs and 
   two remote public keys.  This key exchange method provides implicit 
   server authentication as defined in [RFC4253].  The ECMQV key 
   exchange method is OPTIONAL. 
 
   The key exchange method name defined for use with this key exchange 
   is "ecmqv-sha2".  This method name gives a hashing algorithm that is 
   to be used for the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) below. 
   Future RFCs may define new method names specifying new hash 
   algorithms for use with ECMQV.  More information about the method 
   name and HMAC can be found in Section 6.4. 
 
   In general, the ECMQV key exchange is performed using the ephemeral 
   and long-term key pair of both the client and server, which is a 
   total of 4 keys.  Within the framework of SSH, the client does not 
   have a long-term key pair that needs to be authenticated.  Therefore, 
   we generate an ephemeral key and use that as both the clients keys. 
   This is more efficient than using two different ephemeral keys, and 
   it does not adversely affect security (it is analogous to the one- 
   pass protocol in Section 6.1 of [LMQSV98]). 
 
   A full description of the ECMQV primitive can be found in Section 3.4 
   of [SEC1].  The algorithm for key pair generation can be found in 
   Section 3.2.1 of [SEC1]. 
 
   During algorithm negotiation with the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT messages, the 
   ECMQV key exchange method can only be chosen if a public key 
   algorithm supporting ECC host keys can also be chosen.  This is due 
   to the use of implicit server authentication in this key exchange 
   method.  This case is handled the same way that key exchange methods 
   requiring encryption/signature capable public key algorithms are 
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   handled in Section 7.1 of [RFC4253].  If ECMQV key exchange is 
   chosen, then the public key algorithm supporting ECC host keys MUST 
   also be chosen. 
 
   ECMQV requires that all the keys used to generate a shared secret are 
   generated over the same elliptic curve domain parameters.  Since the 
   host key is used in the generation of the shared secret, allowing for 
   implicit server authentication, the domain parameters associated with 
   the host key are used throughout this section. 
 
   All elliptic curve public keys MUST be validated after they are 
   received.  An example of a validation algorithm can be found in 
   Section 3.2.2 of [SEC1].  If a key fails validation, the key exchange 
   MUST fail. 
 
   The elliptic curve ephemeral public keys (points) that must be 
   transmitted are encoded into octet strings before they are 
   transmitted.  The transformation between elliptic curve points and 
   octet strings is specified in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 of [SEC1]; 
   point compression MAY be used.  The output of shared key generation 
   is a field element xp.  The SSH framework requires that the shared 
   key be an integer.  The conversion between a field element and an 
   integer is specified in Section 2.3.9 of [SEC1]. 
 
   The following is an overview of the key exchange process: 
 
      Client                                                Server 
      ------                                                ------ 
      Generate ephemeral key pair. 
      SSH_MSG_KEX_ECMQV_INIT -------------> 
 
                                      Verify received key is valid. 
                                       Generate ephemeral key pair. 
                                             Compute shared secret. 
                                Generate exchange hash and compute 
                              HMAC over it using the shared secret. 
                            <------------- SSH_MSG_KEX_ECMQV_REPLY 
 
      Verify received keys are valid. 
      *Verify host key belongs to server. 
      Compute shared secret. 
      Verify HMAC. 
 
      *  It is RECOMMENDED that the client verify that the host key sent 
         is the server's host key (for example, using a local database). 
         The client MAY accept the host key without verification, but 
         doing so will render the protocol insecure against active 
         attacks. 
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   The specification of the message numbers SSH_MSG_ECMQV_INIT and 
   SSH_MSG_ECMQV_REPLY can be found in Section 7. 
 
   This key exchange algorithm is implemented with the following 
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   messages. 
 
   The client sends: 
 
      byte     SSH_MSG_ECMQV_INIT 
      string   Q_C, client's ephemeral public key octet string 
 
   The server sends: 
 
      byte     SSH_MSG_ECMQV_REPLY 
      string   K_S, server's public host key 
      string   Q_S, server's ephemeral public key octet string 
      string   HMAC tag computed on H using the shared secret 
 
   The hash H is formed by applying the algorithm HASH on a 
   concatenation of the following: 
 
      string   V_C, client's identification string (CR and LF excluded) 
      string   V_S, server's identification string (CR and LF excluded) 
      string   I_C, payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT 
      string   I_S, payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT 
      string   K_S, server's public host key 
      string   Q_C, client's ephemeral public key octet string 
      string   Q_S, server's ephemeral public key octet string 
      mpint    K,   shared secret 
 
6.  Method Names 
 
   This document defines a new family of key exchange method names, a 
   new key exchange method name, and a new family of public key 
   algorithm names in the SSH name registry. 
 
6.1.  Elliptic Curve Domain Parameter Identifiers 
 
   This section specifies identifiers encoding named elliptic curve 
   domain parameters.  These identifiers are used in this document to 
   identify the curve used in the SSH ECC public key format, the ECDSA 
   signature blob, and the ECDH method name. 
 
   For the REQUIRED elliptic curves nistp256, nistp384, and nistp521, 
   the elliptic curve domain parameter identifiers are the strings 
   "nistp256", "nistp384", and "nistp521". 
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   For all other elliptic curves, including all other NIST curves and 
   all other RECOMMENDED curves, the elliptic curve domain parameter 
   identifier is the ASCII period-separated decimal representation of 
   the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [ASN1] Object Identifier 
   (OID) of the named curve domain parameters that are associated with 
   the server's ECC host keys.  This identifier is defined provided that 
   the concatenation of the public key format identifier and the 
   elliptic curve domain parameter identifier (or the method name and 
   the elliptic curve domain parameter identifier) does not exceed the 
   maximum specified by the SSH protocol architecture [RFC4251], namely 
   64 characters; otherwise, the identifier for that curve is undefined, 
   and the curve is not supported by this specification. 
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   A list of the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED curves and their OIDs can be 
   found in Section 10. 
 
   Note that implementations MUST use the string identifiers for the 
   three REQUIRED NIST curves, even when an OID exists for that curve. 
 
6.2.  ECC Public Key Algorithm (ecdsa-sha2-*) 
 
   The SSH ECC public key algorithm is specified by a family of public 
   key format identifiers.  Each identifier is the concatenation of the 
   string "ecdsa-sha2-" with the elliptic curve domain parameter 
   identifier as defined in Section 6.1.  A list of the required and 
   recommended curves and their OIDs can be found in Section 10. 
 
   For example, the method name for ECDH key exchange with ephemeral 
   keys generated on the nistp256 curve is "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256". 
 
6.2.1.  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
 
   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is specified 
   for use with the SSH ECC public key algorithm. 
 
   The hashing algorithm defined by this family of method names is the 
   SHA2 family of hashing algorithms [FIPS-180-3].  The algorithm from 
   the SHA2 family that will be used is chosen based on the size of the 
   named curve specified in the public key: 
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                    +----------------+----------------+ 
                    |   Curve Size   | Hash Algorithm | 
                    +----------------+----------------+ 
                    |    b <= 256    |     SHA-256    | 
                    |                |                | 
                    | 256 < b <= 384 |     SHA-384    | 
                    |                |                | 
                    |     384 < b    |     SHA-512    | 
                    +----------------+----------------+ 
 
6.3.  ECDH Key Exchange Method Names (ecdh-sha2-*) 
 
   The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange is defined by a 
   family of method names.  Each method name is the concatenation of the 
   string "ecdh-sha2-" with the elliptic curve domain parameter 
   identifier as defined in Section 6.1.  A list of the required and 
   recommended curves and their OIDs can be found in Section 10. 
 
   For example, the method name for ECDH key exchange with ephemeral 
   keys generated on the sect409k1 curve is "ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.36". 
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   The hashing algorithm defined by this family of method names is the 
   SHA2 family of hashing algorithms [FIPS-180-3].  The hashing 
   algorithm is defined in the method name to allow room for other 
   algorithms to be defined in future documents.  The algorithm from the 
   SHA2 family that will be used is chosen based on the size of the 
   named curve specified in the method name according to the table in 
   Section 6.2.1. 
 
   The concatenation of any so encoded ASN.1 OID specifying a set of 
   elliptic curve domain parameters with "ecdh-sha2-" is implicitly 
   registered under this specification. 
 
6.4.  ECMQV Key Exchange and Verification Method Name (ecmqv-sha2) 
 
   The Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key exchange is 
   defined by the method name "ecmqv-sha2".  Unlike the ECDH key 
   exchange method, ECMQV relies on a public key algorithm that uses ECC 
   keys: it does not need a family of method names because the curve 
   information can be gained from the public key algorithm. 
 
   The hashing and message authentication code algorithms are defined by 
   the method name to allow room for other algorithms to be defined for 
   use with ECMQV in future documents. 
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   The hashing algorithm defined by this method name is the SHA2 family 
   of hashing algorithms [FIPS-180-3].  The algorithm from the SHA2 
   family that will be used is chosen based on the size of the named 
   curve specified for use with ECMQV by the chosen public key algorithm 
   according to the table in Section 6.2.1. 
 
   The keyed-hash message authentication code that is used to identify 
   the server and verify communications is based on the hash chosen 
   above.  The information on implementing the HMAC based on the chosen 
   hash algorithm can be found in [RFC2104]. 
 
7.  Key Exchange Messages 
 
   The message numbers 30-49 are key-exchange-specific and in a private 
   namespace defined in [RFC4250] that may be redefined by any key 
   exchange method [RFC4253] without requiring an IANA registration 
   process. 
 
   The following message numbers have been defined in this document: 
 
7.1.  ECDH Message Numbers 
 
      #define SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT                30 
      #define SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY               31 
 
7.2.  ECMQV Message Numbers 
 
      #define SSH_MSG_ECMQV_INIT                   30 
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      #define SSH_MSG_ECMQV_REPLY                  31 
 
8.  Manageability Considerations 
 
   As this document only provides new public key algorithms and key 
   exchange methods within the existing Secure Shell protocol 
   architecture, there are few manageability considerations beyond those 
   that apply for existing Secure Shell implementations.  Additional 
   manageability considerations are listed below. 
 
8.1.  Control of Function through Configuration and Policy 
 
   Section 10 specifies REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED elliptic curve domain 
   parameters to be used with the public key algorithms and key exchange 
   methods defined in this document.  Implementers SHOULD allow system 
   administrators to disable some curves, including REQUIRED or 
   RECOMMENDED curves, to meet local security policy. 
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8.2.  Impact on Network Operation 
 
   As this document provides new functionality within the Secure Shell 
   protocol architecture, the only impact on network operations is the 
   impact on existing Secure Shell implementations.  The Secure Shell 
   protocol provides negotiation mechanisms for public key algorithms 
   and key exchange methods: any implementations that do not recognize 
   the algorithms and methods defined in this document will ignore them 
   in the negotiation and use the next mutually supported algorithm or 
   method, causing no negative impact on backward compatibility. 
 
   The use of elliptic curve cryptography should not place a significant 
   computational burden on an implementing server.  In fact, due to its 
   smaller key sizes, elliptic curve cryptography can be implemented 
   more efficiently for the same security level than RSA, finite field 
   Diffie-Hellman, or DSA. 
 
9.  Security Considerations 
 
   This document provides new public key algorithms and new key 
   agreement methods for the Secure Shell protocol.  For the most part, 
   the security considerations involved in using the Secure Shell 
   protocol apply.  Additionally, implementers should be aware of 
   security considerations specific to elliptic curve cryptography. 
 
   For all three classes of functionality added by this document (the 
   public key algorithms involving ECDSA, key exchange involving ECDH, 
   and authenticated key exchange involving ECMQV), the current best 
   known technique for breaking the cryptosystems is by solving the 
   elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). 
 
   The difficulty of breaking the ECDLP depends on the size and quality 
   of the elliptic curve parameters.  Certain types of curves can be 
   more susceptible to known attacks than others.  For example, curves 
   over finite fields GF(2^m), where m is composite, may be susceptible 
   to an attack based on the Weil descent.  All of the RECOMMENDED 
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   curves in Section 10 do not have this problem.  System administrators 
   should be cautious when enabling curves other than the ones specified 
   in Section 10 and should make a more detailed investigation into the 
   security of the curve in question. 
 
   It is believed (see, for example, Section B.2.1 of [SEC1]) that when 
   curve parameters are generated at random, the curves will be 
   resistant to special attacks, and must rely on the most general 
   attacks.  The REQUIRED curves in Section 10 were all generated 
   verifiably pseudorandomly.  The runtime of general attacks depends on 
   the algorithm used.  At present, the best known algorithm is the 
   Pollard-rho method.  (Shor's algorithm for quantum computers can 
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   solve the ECDLP in polynomial time, but at present large-scale 
   quantum computers have not been constructed and significant 
   experimental physics and engineering work needs to be done before 
   large-scale quantum computers can be constructed.  There is no solid 
   estimate as to when this may occur, but it is widely believed to be 
   at least 20 years from the present.) 
 
   Based on projections of computation power, it is possible to estimate 
   the running time of the best known attacks based on the size of the 
   finite field.  The table in Section 1 gives an estimate of the 
   equivalence between elliptic curve field size and symmetric key size. 
   Roughly speaking, an N-bit elliptic curve offers the same security as 
   an N/2-bit symmetric cipher, so a 256-bit elliptic curve (such as the 
   REQUIRED nistp256 curve) is suitable for use with 128-bit AES, for 
   example. 
 
   Many estimates consider that 2^80-2^90 operations are beyond 
   feasible, so that would suggest using elliptic curves of at least 
   160-180 bits.  The REQUIRED curves in this document are 256-, 384-, 
   and 521-bit curves; implementations SHOULD NOT use curves smaller 
   than 160 bits. 
 
   A detailed discussion on the security considerations of elliptic 
   curve domain parameters and the ECDH, ECDSA, and ECMQV algorithms can 
   be found in Appendix B of [SEC1]. 
 
   Additionally, the key exchange methods defined in this document rely 
   on the SHA2 family of hash functions, defined in [FIPS-180-3].  The 
   appropriate security considerations of that document apply.  Although 
   some weaknesses have been discovered in the predecessor, SHA-1, no 
   weaknesses in the SHA2 family are known at present.  The SHA2 family 
   consists of four variants -- SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-521 
   -- named after their digest lengths.  In the absence of special 
   purpose attacks exploiting the specific structure of the hash 
   function, the difficulty of finding collisions, preimages, and second 
   preimages for the hash function is related to the digest length. 
   This document specifies in Section 6.2.1 which SHA2 variant should be 
   used with which elliptic curve size based on this guidance. 
 
   Since ECDH and ECMQV allow for elliptic curves of arbitrary sizes and 
   thus arbitrary security strength, it is important that the size of 
   elliptic curve be chosen to match the security strength of other 
   elements of the SSH handshake.  In particular, host key sizes, 
   hashing algorithms and bulk encryption algorithms must be chosen 
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   appropriately.  Information regarding estimated equivalence of key 
   sizes is available in [NIST-800-57]; the discussion in [RFC3766] is 
   also relevant.  We note in particular that when ECDSA is used as the 
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   signature algorithm and ECDH is used as the key exchange method, if 
   curves of different sizes are used, then it is possible that 
   different hash functions from the SHA2 family could be used. 
 
   The REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED curves in this document are at present 
   believed to offer security at the levels indicated in this section 
   and as specified with the table in Section 1. 
 
   System administrators and implementers should take careful 
   consideration of the security issues when enabling curves other than 
   the REQUIRED or RECOMMENDED curves in this document.  Not all 
   elliptic curves are secure, even if they are over a large field. 
 
   Implementers SHOULD ensure that any ephemeral private keys or random 
   values -- including the value k used in ECDSA signature generation 
   and the ephemeral private key values in ECDH and ECMQV -- are 
   generated from a random number generator or a properly seeded 
   pseudorandom number generator, are protected from leakage, are not 
   reused outside of the context of the protocol in this document, and 
   are erased from memory when no longer needed. 
 
10.  Named Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters 
 
   Implementations MAY support any ASN.1 object identifier (OID) in the 
   ASN.1 object tree that defines a set of elliptic curve domain 
   parameters [ASN1]. 
 
10.1.  Required Curves 
 
   Every SSH ECC implementation MUST support the named curves below. 
   These curves are defined in [SEC2]; the NIST curves were originally 
   defined in [NIST-CURVES].  These curves SHOULD always be enabled 
   unless specifically disabled by local security policy. 
 
              +----------+-----------+---------------------+ 
              |   NIST*  |    SEC    |         OID         | 
              +----------+-----------+---------------------+ 
              | nistp256 | secp256r1 | 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistp384 | secp384r1 |     1.3.132.0.34    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistp521 | secp521r1 |     1.3.132.0.35    | 
              +----------+-----------+---------------------+ 
 
      *  For these three REQUIRED curves, the elliptic curve domain 
         parameter identifier is the string in the first column of the 
         table, the NIST name of the curve.  (See Section 6.1.) 
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10.2.  Recommended Curves 
 
   It is RECOMMENDED that SSH ECC implementations also support the 
   following curves.  These curves are defined in [SEC2]. 
 
              +----------+-----------+---------------------+ 
              |   NIST   |    SEC    |         OID*        | 
              +----------+-----------+---------------------+ 
              | nistk163 | sect163k1 |     1.3.132.0.1     | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistp192 | secp192r1 | 1.2.840.10045.3.1.1 | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistp224 | secp224r1 |     1.3.132.0.33    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistk233 | sect233k1 |     1.3.132.0.26    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistb233 | sect233r1 |     1.3.132.0.27    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistk283 | sect283k1 |     1.3.132.0.16    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistk409 | sect409k1 |     1.3.132.0.36    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistb409 | sect409r1 |     1.3.132.0.37    | 
              |          |           |                     | 
              | nistt571 | sect571k1 |     1.3.132.0.38    | 
              +----------+-----------+---------------------+ 
 
      *  For these RECOMMENDED curves, the elliptic curve domain 
         parameter identifier is the string in the third column of the 
         table, the ASCII representation of the OID of the curve.  (See 
         Section 6.1.) 
 
11.  IANA Considerations 
 
   Consistent with Section 8 of [RFC4251] and Section 4.6 of [RFC4250], 
   this document makes the following registrations: 
 
   In the Public Key Algorithm Names registry: The family of SSH public 
   key algorithm names beginning with "ecdsa-sha2-" and not containing 
   the at-sign ('@'), to name the public key algorithms defined in 
   Section 3. 
 
   In the Key Exchange Method Names registry: The family of SSH key 
   exchange method names beginning with "ecdh-sha2-" and not containing 
   the at-sign ('@'), to name the key exchange methods defined in 
   Section 4. 
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   In the Key Exchange Method Names registry: The SSH key exchange 
   method name "ecmqv-sha2" to name the key exchange method defined in 
   Section 5. 
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   This document creates no new registries. 
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